Internal Agents Map

Spectre

Harvey's internal collaborative cloud agent platform; turns requests from Slack, the web app, or automations into durable runs that return reviewable summaries, diffs, branches, and PRs.

Company
Harvey
Approach type
Platform
Interfaces
Slack, Web, Automation, Cli
Deployment stage
Deployed
Evidence strength
Detailed primary
Entry reviewed
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Capabilities and architecture

Model
Not reportedThe post describes provider adapters and multi-provider support but names no model.
Harness
Collaborative cloud agent platform with explicit boundaries around GitHub, Datadog, Linear, and other connected systems[Source 1]
Sandbox
Isolated ephemeral execution environments; durable runs[Source 1]
Tool access
Explicit tool boundaries; tool configuration injected at run start; requests start from Slack, the web app, or automations; connects to systems like GitHub, Datadog, and Linear[Source 1]
Knowledge
Not reportedNo knowledge store for Spectre runs is documented; the SOC's memory system belongs to the separate security platform.
Context management
Durable runs over disposable execution environments[Source 1]
Credentials
Short-lived, scoped credentials injected at run start; no ambient access to the control plane or a user's machine[Source 1]
Interfaces

The CLI joins Slack, the web app, and automations as a surface over the same durable run.

  • slack
  • web
  • automation
  • cli
[Source 1]

Mechanisms

Durable runs / ephemeral execution

Long-lived run state over throwaway compute[Source 1]

Reviewable artifacts

Returns summaries, diffs, branches, and pull requests alongside the run history[Source 1]

Documented uses

Request from Slack, the web app, an automation, or the CLI through a sandboxed durable run to reviewable artifacts.

Start a durable run

A request from Slack, the web app, an automation, or the CLI creates a durable run and starts a fresh sandbox that hydrates the repository[Source 1]

Execute the agent in the sandbox

The worker runs the agent, streams output, and reaches approved external systems through tool configuration injected at run start[Source 1]

Return reviewable artifacts

The run persists summaries, diffs, branches, and pull requests; a failed run returns the result to a person who decides what happens next[Source 1]

Access and controls

See documented credential and access boundaries in the architecture above. Scoped human-review assessments for individual uses remain in research details.

Reliability and validation

Scheduled verification loops

Cron-based automations materialize ordinary runs for cleanup passes, test generation, dependency checks, and verification loops[Source 1]

Adoption and operating evidence

Not reported: The platform post reports no measured outcomes. The security article's figures describe the separate agentic SOC, which runs on its own infrastructure by design.

Lessons

Spectre returns branches, diffs, summaries, and run history so another person can inspect or continue the work.[Source 1]

Reported opinion: Harvey identifies coordination, ownership, and retained context as challenges when many people and agents share work.[Source 1]

Reported opinion: Harvey keeps Spectre and its security agents on separate infrastructure to limit the consequences of a compromised product agent.[Source 2]

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Sources and research details

Citations link to the original publisher. Each source also keeps a preserved copy in the repository, so a changed or removed page stays checkable.

  1. Building Spectre; internal collaborative cloud agent platformhttps://www.harvey.ai/blog/building-spectre-internal-collaborative-cloud-agent-platformEngineering blog · First party · Last source verification: 2026-08-31
  2. Building an agentic security operations centerhttps://www.harvey.ai/blog/building-an-agentic-security-operations-centerEngineering blog · First party · Last source verification: 2026-08-31
Question coverage and scope
purpose
Reported
workflow
Reported: The named run is the first-version flow the post documents: create a run, start a fresh sandbox, hydrate the repository, run the agent, stream output, persist artifacts.
human involvement
Not applicable: There is no single platform-wide agent review boundary. Scoped downstream operating-model claims remain in research details; access controls are described separately.
implementation
Reported
validation
Reported: Verification loops run as scheduled ordinary runs; the post documents no separate check inside an interactive run beyond the review boundary.
observations
Not reported: The platform post reports no measured outcomes. The security article's figures describe the separate agentic SOC, which runs on its own infrastructure by design.
lessons
Reported
Research details for every claim on this page
  1. Summary
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  2. Sandbox
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  3. Harness
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  4. Interfaces
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  5. Tool access
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  6. Credentials
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  7. Context management
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  8. Durable runs / ephemeral execution
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  9. Reviewable artifacts
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  10. Start a durable run
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  11. Execute the agent in the sandbox
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  12. Return reviewable artifacts
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  13. Scheduled verification loops
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Not assessed
    Confidence reason
    No explicit confidence assessment is recorded for this claim.
  14. Lesson
    Statement type
    Fact
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Medium
    Confidence reason
    The platform introduction and execution flow name reviewable artifacts and a human decision point when a run fails.
  15. Lesson
    Statement type
    Opinion
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Medium
    Confidence reason
    The authors frame these as engineering challenges and describe a durable run as their response; they do not quantify a shift in review bottlenecks.
  16. Lesson
    Statement type
    Opinion
    Provenance
    Reported
    Confidence
    Medium
    Confidence reason
    The security article explains that sharing detection knowledge and investigation memory would expose information valuable to an attacker; this is Harvey's design rationale.
  17. Operating model assessment

    Level 3 for request from Slack, the web app, or an automation → reviewable diff or pull request; human attention boundary: work-product review.

    Statement type
    Inference
    Provenance
    Catalog judgment
    Confidence
    High
    Confidence reason
    The source explicitly frames diffs, branches, and pull requests as reviewable outputs.
    Observation date
    2026